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In  Western Europe, many contemporary churches have 
achieved remarkable levels of administrative autonomy and tan­
gible resource support. Yet paradoxically, public participation 
in the traditional churches appears marginal. In Eastern Eu­
rope under Communism, churches experienced varying levels 
of hostility and bare toleration. Yet also paradoxically, some 
Eastern European churches nevertheless sustained membership 
growth. Since the fall of the Soviet communist regimes, more­
over, a number of churches have re-emerged as vibrant forces 
in their respective nations. Is the inference to be drawn that 
state hostility produces strength while state support produces 
neglect? Of course, an impressive number of factors other than 
the state help shape the organizational presence of a church. 
The concern of this essay, however, is the state regulation of 
churches and the consequences of the regulatory environment, 
often unintended, for both state and church.
This essay explores the consequences of the regulatory pat­
terns that have emerged in eastern and western European 
church-state relations since the end of the Second World War. 
The aim is to see if an understanding of these regulatory re­
gimes can help in understanding the apparent paradoxes in Eu­
ropean church-state regulatory relationships. It is argued that 
the regulatory regimes that have developed in Europe have cre­
ated incentives for European churches to play roles in society 
other than that of mobilizing participation in institutionalized 
religion. Traditional European churches have responded to the 
regulatory environment by becoming more involved in educa-
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tion, charity, and political commentary, rather than in the direct 
encouragement of religious life.
Re g u l a t io n  a n d  Re l ig io n
Regulation, as defined in this essay, is the setting of limits on 
group or individual conduct for public purposes. Through regu­
lation, the state sets limits rather than proscribing behavior. 
Theodore J. Lowi has argued that regulation may be seen as 
morally ambiguous if the behavior to be regulated is deeply con­
troversial. Groups engaged in the activity will resent the activ­
ity being constrained, while critics of the activity will question 
why it has not been proscribed.1 Thus, if religion is judged as 
the opiate of the people, opponents of churches will question 
why churches are not banned rather than regulated. If free­
dom of religion is of paramount value, supporters of a church 
may object to regulation.
Regulation may embrace a remarkable range of activities. 
We most frequently think about regulation in the economic 
sphere. Here the state’s intervention is most likely to occur 
when there is market failure. A firm or combination of firms has 
established a monopoly that allows them to set higher prices for 
a product or a service at lower levels of production than would 
be found in a competitive market environment. Through regu­
lation, the state establishes a structure to review the behavior of 
the firm. On the basis of the information gathered, the state 
may establish production guidelines and ceilings on prices. The 
state may also establish standards to maintain the quality of the 
product and process by which the product is produced.
Regulation has its critics.2 Indeed, a theory of regulatory fail­
ure has developed; a central point in this theory is that regula­
tion becomes ineffective over time and often works to the 
advantage of the regulated rather than the regulators. It is in 
the tradition of this critique of regulation that this essay seeks to 
apply regulatory analysis to church-state relationships.
Three recurring themes found in studies of regulatory failure 
are really variations on the theme of the ineffectiveness of regu­
lation. First is that of capture. Over time — perhaps indeed 
from the inception of regulation — the firm or the industry can
1. Theodore J. Lowi, “Liberal and Conservative Theories of Regulation,” in G.C. 
Bryner and D.L. Thompson, eds., The Constitution and the Regulation o f  Society 
(Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1988), 7-42.
2. Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics o f  Regulation: Principles and Institutions 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1988).
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secure state resources and insulate itself from competition be­
cause of a number of advantages that it has over the designated 
regulatory agency. Most notably, these advantages are informa­
tion and political power.3
The second theme is that of adaptation. The regulated en­
terprise adapts to the variety of incentives and disincentives 
created by the regulatory regime. For example, if regulation of 
telecommunications governs local calls but not long distance 
calls, then the telecommunications firm’s energies are likely to 
be directed at realizing income from its long distance service. If 
state subsidies are available for certain services but not for 
others, the regulated telecommunications firm is likely to adapt 
its commitments to services with the enhanced return provided 
by subsidies. Adaptation to the regulatory environment may un­
dermine the objectives identified in establishing the original 
regulatory regime.
The third theme is that ineffectiveness may be brought 
about by over-regulation. So complex a set of responsibilities 
may be placed on the regulators that the end result is under­
regulation. The state elaborates a set of objectives to regulate a 
specific industry but finds that it has created far too demanding 
a regulatory framework. This leads in turn to the paradox of 
under-regulation as the state’s regulators retreat from the 
daunting task of regulation. For example, the competing objec­
tives of universal service, cost control, and environmental qual­
ity often pose formidable challenges to the task of regulators. 
Regulation of utilities is a contemporary example of how the 
complexity of regulation, with the competing goals of universal 
service, rate setting, and air quality, can produce regulatory 
quandaries.4
There are of course limits to the parallel between the regula­
tion of firms and the regulation of churches. A basic difference 
is that a church draws its support on the basis of religious com­
mitment — presumably a quite different source of commitment 
than consumer preference for many people. In the fundamental 
relationship between the church and its members, there is no 
clear unit of exchange that lends itself to quantification. Per­
haps much more so than firms, however, churches have the ca­
pacity to mobilize their memberships on behalf of their
3. George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal o f  Eco­
nomics and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971): 3-21.
4. Terry M. Moe, “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of 
the NLRB,” American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985): 1094-116.
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objectives in negotiating with the state. Another difference is 
that states’ seeking to regulate churches often lack doctrinal 
competence. They may be ill-equipped to understand the 
church’s mission and lack information as to church resources 
and the best uses of those resources. Finally, another principal 
difference is that the relationship between a nation and the reli­
gious commitments of its citizens is the consequence of many 
forces acting over long periods of time. These forces may have 
created in a population religious commitments of singular inten­
sity or, on the other hand, apparent disinterest that has little to 
do with the direction of contemporary state, regulation of reli­
gion. Despite these differences, however, the case can still be 
made that regulatory theory is relevant to the understanding of 
church-state relationships. This essay argues that the direction 
of contemporary state regulation may help shape the direction 
of a church’s priorities and activities independently of the condi­
tion of the population’s religious commitment. Churches as or­
ganizations will respond to regulatory incentives and costs, just 
as they respond to the political environment.
Why do states seek to regulate churches? Historically, as will 
be shown below, rulers may have sought to impose on their sub­
jects their own respective judgments about the correct institu­
tional expression of their faith. States have seen regulation as a 
means to weed out corruption or to redress the distribution of 
resources in their society. Quite often, states have appeared to 
fear churches as challenges to the political order that need to be 
contained.
Historically, regulation of churches by European states has 
embraced some or all of a number of areas. States have played 
significant roles in regulating or ultimately selecting senior 
church leaderships within the country. States have assumed the 
power to determine the numbers and types of clergy allowed to 
practice their religious responsibilities within the nation. The 
state’s approval has been sought in determining the boundaries 
of church administrative territories. The state’s acquiescence 
has played a role in church reform of doctrine or liturgy. States 
have from time to time set limits on the nature of church parti­
cipation in education, public communication, social welfare, and 
health care. Finally, states have limited — or enhanced — 
churches’ ability to own property or businesses.
At this time, virtually every church, at least in Western Eu­
rope, has achieved a remarkable measure of autonomy in the 
determination of its leadership, its size, and the direction of its
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clergy. By contrast, historically in Roman Catholic countries, 
the state or the aristocracy controlled higher-level clerical ap­
pointments or shared in appointment decisions with the Vati­
can. In many Protestant states, the state exercised the power of 
appointment with relatively little formal consultation with 
church hierarchies. At the same time, the capacity of the 
church to establish a central role in a society’s institutions has 
diminished and a review of church attendance in Western Eu­
rope suggests remarkable declines in membership.
Churches may find that regulation benefits their own posi­
tions in society. In many cases these churches confront receding 
memberships. Catholic churches in nearly all Western Euro­
pean states enjoy sustained and significant declines in the con­
flicts with state authorities that were recurring crises during the 
nineteenth and a good deal of the twentieth century. This de­
cline in conflict undoubtedly is related to the effective de- 
churching of many of the European populations. Regulation in 
these cases appears to be actively sought by churches as a means 
of sustaining resource flows. This relationship of negotiating 
support in exchange for some measure of regulation appears to 
be the emerging norm of convergence in state-church policy 
throughout Europe. But it raises the perplexing question of 
how new churches will respond to a structure of church-state 
relations that does not reflect the neutral tradition of liberalism 
but rather expresses clear although measured support for some 
churches over others in practice and often in theory as well.
A church may seek several objectives in regulation. These 
objectives may undergo change as the regulatory context shifts. 
A church may conclude that regulation provides a competitive 
advantage in dealing with competition with other churches. Es­
tablished, long-existing churches that now enjoy some measure 
of recognition from the state may wish to stabilize the situation 
by delimiting the boundaries of state recognition from newer or 
missionary churches that threaten the membership base of the 
established churches. The established churches may simply be 
concerned with maintaining their existing obligations to staffs, 
buildings, and educational programs. The longer established the 
church, presumably the greater the obligations it has to sustain 
existing organizations. The theory of regulatory capture would 
predict these observations. There is always the risk, however, 
that the capture model of regulation is not predictive of future 
state-church relationships, given the possibilities for new direc­
tions coming from within the state or from groups found neither
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in established church(es) nor in the state. New churches are the 
most likely sources of pressure for changes in the direction of 
regulation.
H y p o t h e s e s
On the basis of this understanding of regulation, four work­
ing hypotheses are derived to focus the analysis of church-state 
relationships in contemporary Europe:
A. If a state sternly regulates a church or churches and is 
able to suppress effectively all other significant independent so­
cial and economic organizations, then there is a reasonable 
probability that the church or churches will become focal points 
for both secular and religious opposition to the state.
B. If a state regulates churches in part by providing state 
income for the churches’ provision of education, health care, or 
other forms of social care, but for no other church activity, then 
it is increasingly likely that the churches will direct their ener­
gies toward these areas of endeavor and will be identified with 
these fields of activity.
C. If a state provides funds to pay for stipends of the 
clergy, then there is a greater likelihood that the hierarchy will 
enjoy greater independence from the laity in making decisions 
and place much less emphasis on maintaining church 
memberships.
D. If a church leadership has over time reduced the role of 
state intervention in the affairs of the church, but has been able 
to sustain material benefits or other measures of preferment, 
then it is a reasonable inference that the church benefits from 
regulation rather than or in addition to the state or the broader 
community.
T h e  C o n t e x t  o f  E u r o p e a n  C h u r c h -St a t e  Re l a t io n s
This section sets the context for testing the hypotheses. His­
torically, church-state relationships have been a recurring and 
significant source of political controversy in European states. 
The outcomes of these controversies may be viewed in terms of 
the following taxonomy: the Erastian model, in which the state 
has assumed responsibility for the direction of the church; the 
liberal model, in which the state is secular and neutral in its re­
lationships with the church(es) found in its society; the theo­
cratic model, in which the church has achieved supremacy in 
religious and secular affairs; the spheres model, in which the
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church prevails in some spheres and the state in other spheres of 
society; and the anti-church model, in which the state stands in 
opposition to the church and seeks to curtail or eliminate 
religion.
The Erastian model. On this model, the state seeks to organ­
ize the church as a department of the state. This model is com­
monly associated with the Protestant German states of the 
Reformation. The Erastian model confronts the problem of in­
ternal religious change, perhaps expressed in controversies over 
liturgy or doctrinal controversies. From the regulatory perspec­
tive, two broad responses to internal change may be taken by 
the Erastian state. First, the state may simply tolerate a good 
deal of doctrinal variation within the church viewed as a com­
mon religious house. Second, the state may seek to play the role 
of arbiter or imprimatur in determining the correctness of cer­
tain positions in theological disputes. Both positions run the risk 
of reduced credibility for both the church and the state.
The liberal model. The liberal model argues for neutrality of 
the state in the affairs of churches. It conceives the state as one 
in which there is no privileged relationship between the state 
and any particular church. Although the liberal model has its 
origins in European thought, it may be argued that it has rarely 
been found in European countries. Few European regimes 
have adopted neutrality as the basis for church-state regulation.
The United States is often judged to be a better example 
than European nations of the application of the liberal tradition 
to church-state relations.5
The United States also is a nation with one of the highest 
rates of church attendance on either side of the North Atlantic. 
Does the fact that the American state constructs church-state 
relations as a wall of separation contribute to the apparently 
greater American public willingness to attend church and to at­
tach importance to religion? Roger Finke has argued that the 
deregulation of churches in the United States has promoted reli­
gious individualism; that is, for an American church to survive it 
must attract communicants in the open market by responding 
to the individual’s understanding of religion as one of personal 
conversion.6
The theocratic model. Here the church assumes or is given a
5. Robert Audi, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citi­
zenship,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (Summer 1989): 259-96.
6 . Roger Finke, “Religious Deregulation: Origins and Consequences,” Journal o f  
Church and State 32 (Summer 1990): 609-26.
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sphere of influence that embraces both religious and secular 
spheres. As with the state in the Erastian model, the church is 
supreme and so the question of the state’s defining boundaries 
does not arise. The church’s autonomy in determining public 
policy is not confined to its membership but embraces the 
broader community in which the church is located. This model 
may exist in regions within a state but certainly is not character­
istic of nations in Europe today. The best example of a European 
theocracy in the last century was the Papal states in what is now 
modern Italy.
The spheres model. This model can best be described by say­
ing what it is not. It is not the liberal tradition or the Erastian or 
the theocratic. Rather, it may be described as the situation in 
which the society is understood as made up of competing or per­
haps complementary spheres. Conflicts between the Holy Ro­
man Emperors and religious hierarchies often reflected this 
battle over spheres of autonomy. Variations of this model are 
found in a remarkably wide range of European nations today. 
These range from nations that profess to be of a certain church, 
to others that are critical of a specific church. Samuel Krislov 
argues that the determination of boundaries between church 
and state is enormously difficult in any system that seeks to rec­
ognize separate spheres of responsibility between a church and 
a state.7 It is probably useful to conceptualize the spheres 
model as a continuum. At one end are the Roman Catholic 
Churches in Ireland and in today’s Poland, where the sphere of 
church influence is quite large and embraces many areas of pub­
lic policy making. At the other end of the continuum are Scan­
dinavian churches which have narrowly-defined spheres of 
influence in public policy making.
The anti-church model. This final model is one in which the 
state is deeply critical if not in outright opposition to the church. 
The former regimes of Eastern Europe reflected an oppositional 
tradition as historically did the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century regimes in Mexico and in France which often sought to 
disestablish or to curtail church life severely. Examples of oppo­
sition include expulsion of religious orders, seizure of church re­
sources, and prohibition of many church-sponsored activities.
There are two critical points concerning these models and
7. Samuel Krislov, “Alternatives to Separation of Church and State in Countries 
Outside the United States,” in Religion and the State: Essays in Honor o f  Leo Pfef- 
fe r , ed. James E. Wood, Jr. (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 1985), 421-40.
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their relevance to the examination of the hypotheses put forth 
in this essay. First, in practice the liberal model has not charac­
terized the political relationships between the state and major 
churches, although liberalism has been advocated by significant 
numbers of people within European nations. Second, most Eu­
ropean nations at different eras have experienced more than 
one of the other models of church-state relationships. The im­
plication that these two point for testing the hypotheses is that 
there are very real and long-standing traditions in European 
politics, characterized by sharp conflicts or at other times by 
close identification between church and state. The heritage for 
church-state relations can mean deep suspicion of churches by 
portions of the population. For others, the heritage may be a 
very deep suspicion of the state’s policies toward a specific 
church. This tradition of distrust directed at the state has been 
compounded by conflicts among different churches. The inten­
sity of church-state politics increased in the nineteenth century 
with the emergence of political movements of the Left that 
were often committed to anti-church programs. This heritage 
of conflict and collaboration, but never remoteness, between 
church and state has structured the regulatory regimes that 
formed in Europe after the Second World War. In the after­
math of the War, there was an interest on the part of many 
church leaders and political leaders, particularly on the conti­
nent, to search for some measure of accommodation and stabil­
ity in church-state relationships.
The aim in the analysis that follows is not a testing, but an 
exploration of the four hypotheses. The exploration relies on 
accounts of policies and events pertinent to church-state rela­
tionships in major European states. In addition, public opinion 
survey data is used to assess priorities in popular attitudes to­
wards participation in church life.
The regulatory relationships that have developed in many 
parts of Europe are the result of regimes formed by the respec­
tive states and the main Protestant and Catholic churches found 
within their borders. These relationships reflect the longstand­
ing, interwoven relationships between the churches and their 
respective states. It is suggested in the analysis that follows that 
the regulatory regimes which have developed have given pre­
ferment to the traditional churches. This preferment has taken 
the form of tangible resources and state-sanctioned social roles. 
At the same time, there has been a diminished presence of state 
involvement within the doctrinal and administrative concerns
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of the respective churches. But Europe, as will be described be­
low, is changing as new churches outside the regulatory regime 
gain in numbers while older churches that have enjoyed regula­
tory preferment have come to experience declining active 
memberships. The hypotheses are designed to use the regula­
tory literature to help explain where churches have gained pre­
ferment while increasing their administrative independence 
from the states. It is further contended that the current regula­
tory regime has contributed to deemphasis on mobilizing mem­
bers in the traditional churches.
The countries selected for this examination of church-state 
relations are Italy, France, Germany, and England (not the 
United Kingdom). Illustrations will also be drawn from a 
number of other European countries in order to offer a general 
assessment of the hypotheses concerning the consequences of 
state regulation for church activity. The four nations selected 
for this analysis are among the major European societies. All 
four have experienced at different times quite different church- 
state regulatory regimes. Italy is composed of former states, 
some of which have long traditions of church-state relations 
characterized by the theocratic model. Italy is a society with 
strong liberal and anti-church movements as well. France since 
the Revolution has witnessed a series of regimes, sometimes 
characterized by the anti-church model and other times by the 
spheres model, as well as by significant numbers of liberal sup­
porters in the population. Both Germany, at least in the Prus­
sian lands, and Britain in the English lands have had state- 
established churches. In the case of England, a state church 
continues to exist. A re-unified Germany brings to this analysis a 
national region that experienced a regime characterized by the 
anti-church model for forty years. These rich and varied tradi­
tions of church-state politics provide for an assessment of the 
regulatory regimes that have evolved over the past three de­
cades in Western Europe’s four principal powers.
Italy. In the first half of the nineteenth century the papacy 
was, as it had been for centuries, the temporal ruler of central 
Italy. Since Italian unification, t ie  papacy has ceased to be a 
temporal power of any significance. Of course, the pope contin­
ues to be the spiritual leader of Catholics within Italy and 
throughout the world. This unique relationship between mod­
em  Italy and the Vatican has deeply influenced church-state 
politics. Since unification was completed in 1870, Italian gov­
ernments have held from time to time quite different judg­
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ments as to the role of the Vatican. In the late nineteenth 
century, the Vatican was judged as a threat to unification. In the 
1920s, the Fascists regarded the church as an institution ob­
structing Mussolini’s aim of achieving a monopoly on political 
power. In the postwar Italian Republic, the Vatican was closely 
identified with the ruling Christian Democratic regime, which 
recognized Catholicism as the religion of the Italian people. 
Opposition parties were often critical of this close identification 
between the Catholic Church and the ruling party.
In 1984, a new era began with negotiations culminating be­
tween the Vatican and the ruling coalition in signing a new con­
cordat. Negotiations were prompted by Italian political leaders, 
who were much less interested in intervening in church affairs 
than had been their predecessors. At the same time, Vatican 
officials were concerned with the Catholic Church’s close identi­
fication with the ruling party coalition, specifically the Christian 
Democratic party. The Christian Democrats had been the 
mainstay of every government since the formation of the Italian 
Republic. Nonetheless, in the 1984 concordat negotiations, the 
Church sought to maintain a large measure of its recognition by 
the state.
The Italian relationship between church and state is compli­
cated by the role of the Vatican as seat of the pope. A significant 
factor in the estrangement between the Catholic Church and 
the Italian state was the loss of the papal states during the wars 
of Italian unification and the perceived threat of a liberal Italian 
state to the position and values of the Church. The papacy was 
estranged from the Italian state from the 1860s until the 1920s, 
when a concordat between the Vatican and the Fascist state was 
signed. The treaty outlined the formal relationship between the 
Church and the Italian state. Church-state relations continued 
to be strained during the Fascist era with Mussolini’s push for a 
monopoly on power. Relations improved a great deal after the 
fall of Mussolini and with the creation of the Italian Republic, 
especially with the close alliance between the Christian Demo­
cratic party and the Catholic Church. Deep divisions remained 
between the Church and the significant sectors of Italian society 
which were critical of religion in general and of the Catholic 
Church hierarchy in particular.
The concordat approved by the Italian state and the Vatican 
in 1927 recognized Catholicism as the religion of the Italian 
people. The Vatican was recognized as a sovereign state with 
extra-territorial rights to a number of other buildings in Italy.
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The state was given consultative power and some powers to re­
ject episcopal nominees. Religious education was required in 
Italian state schools with some possibility for opting out. Dioce­
san boundary changes were subject to civil approval. Canon law 
was granted the force of civil law in a number of areas. Clergy 
were to receive stipends from the state. Italian youth and lay 
organizations were permitted to promote religious activities. 
This was an especially important concession on the part of the 
Fascist state in negotiating the concordat, because the Fascists 
were opposed to the presence of non-Fascist groups in the Ital­
ian nation. Finally, in the concordat non-Catholic churches 
were allowed to operate in Italy with the approval of the state.
The 1927 concordat had the effect of strengthening the ulti­
mate political role of the Catholic Church during the Fascist 
period, for few other organizations were allowed to operate 
outside the state. During the 1930s and 1940s, Catholic action 
became the recruiting ground for many future Italian politicians 
who formed under church support the Christian Democratic 
party in the postwar period. In a sense, the Catholic Church and 
the Communist party were the two principal beneficiaries of the 
aftermath of Fascism, for both were able to function during 
the Fascist era — the one above ground and the other below 
ground.
The Christian Democratic party has been the major actor in 
the over fifty postwar governments that have been formed in 
the Italian Republic since its establishment in the late 1940s. 
This has led some to conclude that there is significant identifica­
tion between the Christian Democratic party and the Catholic 
Church. During periods of scandal or dissatisfaction with the 
ruling party, particularly during the 1970s, popular discontent 
seemed to spill over from the party to the Church. The Church 
itself was surprised at its declining influence when it suffered 
two successive defeats in referenda permitting divorce and 
abortion in the 1970s. The capacity of the Church to be influen­
tial in Parliament was not reflected in balloting in the Italian 
electorate at large. In Vatican circles, the defeats were viewed 
as strengthening the case for rebuilding the Church in Italy and 
distancing the Church from the Christian Democratic party.
At least since the 1960s, there were demands from a number 
of groups to revise the 1927 concordat. The election of a Polish 
pope and the rise of the first Socialist prime minister brought
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the process of revision to closure in 1984.8 The revised concor­
dat continued the basic terms of the 1927 pact, along with some 
important changes that appeared to allow greater distance be­
tween church and state. For example, religious instruction was 
still to be a component of Italian state education but it became 
much easier for students, their parents, or their guardians to opt 
out of the instruction. The state also surrendered its oversight 
of ecclesiastical appointments with the exception of the require­
ment that appointments to Italian positions have Italian 
citizenship.
The major development in current Italian church-state rela­
tions is a shift in how the state supports the stipends of the 
clergy. The arrangement that is about to take effect shifts finan­
cial support over time from direct payments to the clergy to a 
system that is not unlike the German one of voluntary taxation 
in support of churches, described later in this essay. Under the 
new system, Italian citizens may opt to have support for the 
Church collected as part of their tax obligations. Thus the 
Church may no longer assume that its revenue is a given. In­
stead, financial support for the Church must reflect in part the 
commitment of communicants.
The revised concordat appeared to give new standing to 
non-Catholic churches in that it made their recognition by the 
state nearly automatic. Cemeteries that had been Protestant or 
Jewish, but under the old concordat had to be managed by the 
Catholic Church, were now turned over to their respective 
faiths. But it is also clear that small Protestant churches have 
come to regard the revised concordat as giving far greater sup­
port to the Catholic Church than to other churches. For exam­
ple, under the revised concordat if a Protestant family elected 
to have their child not receive Catholic instruction, the child 
was required to take additional classes in another subject mat­
ter. Protestants demonstrated in favor of having the child re­
leased from school rather than being given additional school 
work.9 Recently the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that 
classes in the instruction of the Catholic faith should not become 
a reason for discrimination; students, therefore, should be al­
lowed to leave the school grounds instead of attending the
8. Maria Elisabetta de Franciscus, Italy and the Vatican: The 1984 Concordat 
Between Church and State (New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
9. Rosalie Beck and David Hendon, “Notes on Church and State Affairs "Journal 
o f  Church and State 31 (Autumn 1989): 581-23.
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classes.10 The head of the Italian Bishops’ Conference regretted 
the decision as weakening the transmission of values and violat­
ing the 1984 Concordat. Protestants have also objected to Cath­
olic calls for state support for private Roman Catholic schools.
France. At the turn of this century, France experienced a 
move to a stance somewhere between a liberal and an anti­
church model. The likely political consequences of this move 
provoked considerable debate. It is reasonable to conclude that 
few in 1900 would have predicted the course that church-state 
relations have taken in France. In the years since disestablish­
ment, the French state has moved gradually towards a spheres 
model of church-state relationships. The Roman Catholic 
Church has regained a position of preferment, it is argued be­
low, for some of the services it provides French society. The 
most noteworthy of these services is education. The discussion 
that follows focuses on the predictions of hypotheses B and D, 
concerning the effects of the regulation of services and the pro­
vision of subsidies in understanding how churches adapt to a 
regulatory environment.
Historically, the relationship between the church and the 
French state has undergone a series of dramatic changes. The 
French Revolution of two centuries ago brought about an era of 
sharp controversy over not only the Catholic Church but reli­
gion itself. Portions of France were dechristianized, while other 
sections, notably Brittany, became intensely Catholic and anti­
Revolutionary. The Church regained a good deal of its former 
institutional position when Napoleon signed a concordat with 
the Vatican in order to establish the legitimacy of his regime. In 
successive regimes, the Napoleonic concordat was alternately 
criticized and threatened with denunciation, or relied upon and 
strengthened.
These shifts in church-state relationships reflected the 
sharply different value systems that characterized changing 
French regimes. In the period up to the First World War and, 
some would say, up to the Second World War, the Church was 
identified with the monarchist right in politics. The Napoleonic 
concordat was sustained by the restored monarchies, the Second 
Empire, and part of the Third Republic. But in leftist circles, 
the Church was seen as pursuing an active strategy of challeng­
ing the secular institutions of the French state. The controversy
10. AU Bulletin, “Italian Students Can Opt out of Religion Classes, Says Court,** 
Church and State 44 (May 1991): 21.
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reached a critical point in 1905, when the French Church was 
disestablished. An important point is to ask why the Church was 
not disestablished earlier. Part of the explanation lies in the 
view of some on the Left that as long as the state paid the clergy 
the state could exercise some control over the political activities 
of the clergy.
The 1905 separation did give the Catholic Church the power 
of appointment of bishops but very little else. Religious orders 
were expelled and the state quit paying the stipends of the 
clergy. Cathedrals and churches were declared state property. 
The Church’s income was greatly reduced as a result of the sep­
aration. Ironically, the French Catholic Church lacked any na­
tional institutions because of the mutual fear of the state and the 
Vatican that a French national bishops conference would chal­
lenge either the state or Papal power. In the aftermath of sepa­
ration, a national bishops conference was established to direct 
Catholic policy in France. The period after the First World War 
brought a new stability to church-state relations. The Council of 
State sustained rulings that churches could only be used for reli­
gious purposes. Some funds were also made available for church 
organizations. Other churches were able to operate in France 
but the levels of support available to the Catholic Church even 
after the separation were much greater than those available to 
non-Catholic churches.
In the aftermath of the 1905 separation, the Catholic Church 
itself began to create missions in parts of France.11 Efforts were 
made in the 1920s and onwards to establish a renewed Catholic 
intellectual presence in France. Ultimately, with the coming of 
the Fifth Republic the Church was much harder to characterize 
ideologically . Experiments with worker-priest movements in 
the 1940s, participation in center parties, and the record of 
many Catholics in the Resistance, eroded the distrust that had 
long characterized the attitude of the parties of the Left toward 
the Catholic Church.12 The Church’s efforts in private educa­
tion during the 1950s were encouraged by many Catholic fami­
lies but criticized by advocates of a uniform national educational 
system. The creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, with the 
devoutly-Catholic Charles De Gaulle as president, resulted in
11. John McManners, Church and State in France, 1870-1914 (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1972).
12. William Bosworth, Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France: French Catholic 
Groups on the Threshold o f  the Fifth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1962).
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the state’s assuming the cost of instruction in Catholic schools. In 
the decades that followed, Catholic schools became important to 
many not as institutions of religion but as providers of tradi­
tional education in an age of widening controversy over the di­
rection of the state school sector.13
In 1981, the Socialists came to power for the first time in the 
history of the Fifth Republic. Their secular tradition brought 
about the introduction of a bill that apparently would have 
brought church schools much more under state control. Reac­
tion was swift and massive. In perhaps the largest demonstra­
tions in the history of France, approximately 2 million people 
took to the streets in Paris in favor of autonomous church-run 
schools with state support. A pro-govemment counter demon­
stration drew only seventy-five thousand people. The govern­
ment was forced to abandon its relatively mild bill. Education 
has clearly been the success story of the Catholic Church in 
France.14
The emerging issue on the agenda of French church-state 
relations will be the Moslem community, which is the largest in 
Western Europe. Controversies over dress codes and religious 
instruction steadily grow.15 The levels of support available to 
Roman Catholics simply are not available to Moslems in the 
state that declares support for the separation of church and 
state.
Germany. Germany, more so than any other other country 
in Western Europe, contains within its frequently changing 
boundaries all of the major issue found in church-state relations 
throughout Europe — in addition to the historic conflicts be­
tween Protestants and Catholics; between Protestant Empire 
and Catholic hierarchy, and between the Third Reich and 
churches.
The new challenge for Germany is the integration of the for­
mer East Germany which for the most part possess an anti­
church model. Present-day major German Churches in large 
measure, as a result of state support, are among the wealthiest 
churches in Europe. The discussion of church-state relations 
that follows embraces all of the four hypotheses. The East Ger­
13. J.E. Flower, “The Church,” in France Today; Introductory Studies, 6th ed., 
ed. J.E. Flower (London: Methuen, 1987), 172-95.
14. Julius W. Friend, Seven Years in France: Francois Mitterand and the Unin­
tended Revolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989).
15. AU Bulletin, “France Approves Religious Garb for Islamic Students,” Church 
and State 43 (January 1990): 22.
HeinOnline -- 34 J. Church & St. 790 1992
STRUCTURE OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 791
man experience allows for the an examination of a church as 
focal point for opposition of experience. The German churches 
are deeply involved in both charitable works and social issues 
and yet church attendance is not impressive. German state in­
volvement in matters of doctrine and church administration has 
steadily diminished in the postwar years.
Both Italy and France are countries in which the terms of 
the church-state debate have been the conflict between Catho­
lic and secular forces over what should be the role of the state 
(if any) in supporting the institutions of the Church. In Ger­
many, a nation unified at the same time as Italy in the 1860s, 
two contending religious traditions had coexisted since the Ref­
ormation. In the Empire created by Prince Otto Von Bismarck, 
about two-thirds of the population was Protestant and one-third 
Roman Catholic.
The church-state tradition in the German states, particularly 
the Protestant tradition, placed responsibility for the church in 
the hands of the prince. Prussian monarches assumed leading 
roles in combining different confessions, notably Lutheran and 
Calvinist, into one church. The conflicts of the Reformation had 
established the role of the German princes in determining 
church membership and church structure within their respec­
tive states. The practice in both Catholic and Protestant states 
was quite similar in assigning a pivotal role to the ruling prince. 
The fundamental difference between Catholic and Protestant 
states was the role of the Vatican as a supranational church 
body.
In the enlarging lands of the Prussian state, the King — who 
would later be given the title of Emperor of Germany — be­
came the head of the Evangelical Church in 1871. The state 
assumed responsibility for the material and doctrinal condition 
of the church within its lands. The challenge of German unifica­
tion was the challenge for the Protestant king/emperor to re­
spond to his Catholic subjects who were not members of the 
church he headed. Indeed, the course of public policy decisions 
throughout the relatively short history of the Second Empire 
often produced considerable concern among Catholics that they 
were second-class citizens.
The so-called cultural conflict between Chancellor Bis­
marck’s government and the Roman Catholic Church over edu­
cational policy after the formation of the Empire in 1871 
revealed a sharp clash between the Erastic model and the 
spheres model — that is, between state control of church activi­
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ties and separate arenas of respective church and state auton­
omy. Bismarck ultimately gave way. The Catholic hierarchy 
participated in electoral politics by helping to establish the 
Center party. The collapse of the Empire in 1918 left the Prot­
estant Church without the king /emperor as its organizational 
head, ending an arrangement that had lasted for four hundred 
years. The Protestant Church was rebuilt after 1918 but was 
clearly a troubled organization that was seriously challenged by 
the coming of the Nazi period. The Nazis sought to create their 
own version of the Protestant German church, which divided 
even further a church still dealing with the consequences of the 
Empire’s collapse in 1918.16
The end of the Second World War left a German Protestant 
church led by people committed to making a break with the 
past. Initially, Protestant church leaders sought to maintain the 
unity of the church in a Germany divided into zones by the Al­
lies. Ultimately, the Protestant leadership in the West had to ac­
cept that the organizational division of their church would 
conform to the new boundaries of West and East Germanies.
In contrast to the Protestant experience, the Roman Catholic 
Church gained a reputation of organizational strength during 
both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. The Roman 
Catholic hierarchy seemed to be confident in dealing with the 
Nazis. The Vatican negotiated a concordat with the Nazi regime 
that caused criticism that the Church was legitimizing the Nazi 
state. The concordat was defended as providing protection to 
Catholics during the Nazi period.
In postwar West Germany, the Catholics emerged with a 
better reputation and a stronger church. The newly-created 
West Germany was about equally divided between Catholics 
and Protestants and there was considerable sympathy for 
strengthening the role of religion in the new German state. The 
Roman Catholic hierarchy received support for a number of its 
concerns from American occupational authorities. Both the 
Catholic and the Protestant Churches sought to establish strong 
relationships with the new state. The drafters of the post-Second 
World War West German constitution adopted the financial ar­
rangements that had been established in the Weimar constitu­
tion. The state was authorized to collect tithes from baptized
16. Gordon Craig, Germany: 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1978).
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Christians.17
Both the Protestant and the Catholic Church received fairly 
generous terms of support and recognition from the newly- 
formed West German state. Church-run hospitals and other 
charities were supported by government funding. The Vatican 
was able to retain concordats signed both at the land level (the 
German states) and to retain the accord signed between the 
Third Reich and the Vatican. Thus state-church regulation now 
can occur at both the state and the federal levels of German 
government. Funds were also made available for the mainte­
nance of church buildings and salaries for bishops of both 
churches as well as for the maintenance of episcopal residences. 
There is little doubt today that West German churches are 
among the wealthiest in Europe.
During the 1960s, debate developed over the role of state 
support for confessional schools. Much attention was paid to 
what was said to be lower levels of academic success of German 
Catholics in comparison to German Protestants. Some Catholics 
argued that this disparity in academic performance was attribu­
table to the inferior quality of Catholic confessional schools. 
This critique occurred at a time when the Social Democratic 
party was itself concerned over the maintenance of confessional 
schools. In the course of the debate, it became increasingly evi­
dent that the only group in strong support of maintaining the 
confessional schools was the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Catho­
lic laity and Protestants both favored the abolition of confes­
sional schools and the substitution of religious instruction in 
state schools. The debate did result in the phasing out of confes­
sional schools in state after state in the Federal Republic. This 
result demonstrated the decline of the state as a negative exter­
nal unifier in sustaining the power of the hierarchy in speaking 
for German Catholics. The new sympathetic regulatory environ­
ment of post-War Germany had gone a long way toward reduc­
ing the perception of Catholics that they were second class 
citizens. A new common identity for both Catholics and Protes­
tants emerged: citizens of a new Germany. One consequence 
of this new common identity was a decline in the capacity of 
Roman Catholic bishops to speak politically for their communi­
cants, as Catholic Germans saw that they had other effective
17. Frederick Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany (Middletown, Conn.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1973).
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identities in the West German state.18
Few Catholics lived in East Germany and the separated 
Protestant churches did not suffer the regulatory severity im­
posed on churches in some other Eastern European countries. 
Nonetheless, the East German state did not support the 
churches financially and they came to be known as voluntary 
churches. The normalization of relations between the 
Germanys in the early 1970s was helpful to the East German 
churches as funds flowed east from the wealthy West German 
Protestant churches to their much poorer brethren in the 
East.19 The East German Protestant churches became a focal 
point in the peace movement in the early 1980s and many of 
their leaders played an important role in the transition to de­
mocracy in 1989.
But the voluntary East German Protestant churches seemed 
unable to survive the unification of the two Germanys. Funds 
were no longer transferred East and the extension of tithe col­
lection through taxation resulted in an estimated 5 million peo­
ple leaving the former East German churches. There is 
confusion as to why East Germans left their Protestant 
churches. Some argue it was because the East Germans under­
stood that the church tax would give 9 percent of their individ­
ual income to the state rather than 9 percent of what they pay 
in taxes.20 Public opinion surveys suggest that very few German 
young people see much value in any sort of religious commit­
ment.21 Compounding the challenges facing the East German 
Protestant churches is the influx of many mission churches from 
the West who see in this former communist land the prospects 
of conversion of eastern Germans to their respective faiths. Es­
timates put the number of churches now active in the East at 
250 to 350.22
But the generous material recognition of the two main 
churches, Protestant and Catholic, is a larger question for all of 
Germany. This state support has strengthened the churches as 
institutions. Both main churches are deeply committed to a vast
18. Ibid.
19. A.G. Roeber, “Churches in the New Germany,” The Christian Century 107 
(July-August 1990): 692-93.
20. Rosalie Beck and David Hendon, “Notes on Church-State Affairs,” Journal o f  
Church and State 33 (Winter 1991): 183-91.
21. Maria Frise, “Growing Up Without God in a Post-Marx Society,” The German 
Tribune, 4 November 1990, 14-15.
22. Nora Miethka, “The Sects Step in to Exploit the Social Uncertainties in the 
Eastern Laender,”7%e German Tribune, 2 June 1991, 15.
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number of social and health care organizations. These church- 
sponsored organizations are funded by federal and state funds 
but are run by the two churches that are both closely identified 
with social welfare policy issues. But what of other churches 
which simply lack the scale and range of state support?
A case in point is the growing Islamic community. It is esti­
mated that close to 1.5 million Moslems are in Germany, with 
close to fifteen hundred mosques. Many of the mosques appear 
to be run by Islamic Fundamentalists.
Petitions are being circulated in Germany to have Islam rec­
ognized as a religion, which would entitle mosque authorities to 
receive the church tax. The challenge for German authorities is 
that they would be collecting revenues from a religious organi­
zation that is committed to enlarging the size of its commu­
nity.23 The two old established churches appear to have lost 
interest in conversion and increasingly put their efforts into so­
cial welfare, environmental, and other public policy issues in a 
state that has established a regulatory framework that is clearly 
favorable to the two main churches but not to all churches.
Britain. Britain has a heritage of inter- and intra-faith con­
flicts that rivals that of Germany. In the course of the last cen­
tury, Britain has seen a decline in inter-church conflict 
consonant with the growth of state toleration of other churches. 
The legacy of earlier intolerance is, of course, Northern Ire­
land. Among the four main countries examined, Britain is the 
only one that possesses established churches, and then they are 
only in two of the lands that compose the United Kingdom, Eng­
land, and Scotland. Scotland recognizes the Presbyterian 
Church. The Church of England’s role is unique, for not only is 
it the state Church of England but it is formally a part of the 
United Kingdom’s political institutions through episcopal repre­
sentation in Parliament and regular involvement in the political 
rituals of the nation.
The Church of England, although it is the state church, has 
nonetheless witnessed steadily diminishing involvement on the 
part of the British state in regulating doctrine and administra­
tive appointments. Nonetheless, there has not been any correla­
tive reduction in tangible resources provided by the state to the 
church. The Anglican church is very much at the center of ma­
jor public policy debates in the nation, but it is not a church that
23. Baha Gungor, “Islamic Fundamentalism Flexes Its Muscles Among Turks in 
Germany,” The German Tribune, 9 December 1990, 14.
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provides significant social, health-related, or educational serv­
ices. As predicted in hypotheses C and D, the Church of Eng­
land receives a considerable portion of income from state- 
managed funds and enjoys a good deal of autonomy from state 
intervention.
Nonetheless, the British controversies were different from 
controversies in the other countries of this study in that the 
Anglican Church was often challenged in some policy areas such 
as education by two other groups, the Roman Catholic minority 
and the nonconformists (that is, the other major Protestant de­
nominations). A good deal of nineteenth century church regula­
tion consisted of opening up political participation and 
appointments to non-Anglicans. Debates within the Anglican 
Church over liturgy and theological interpretation were also 
heated. Such debates could and did have consequences for 
prime ministers who then as now have the power of appoint­
ment of bishops.
In contemporary England, the Anglican Church is formally 
headed by the monarch. As is the case in so many other areas, 
formal attribution of power to the monarch really means attri­
bution of power to Parliament. The power of episcopal appoint­
ment has been weakened by requiring widespread consultation 
and the development of a short list of candidates for an episco­
pal vacancy prepared by a list of senior churchmen. Strongly 
supported candidates would present a difficult challenge for a 
prime minister to reject. Funding for the Anglican Church 
comes in part from revenues earned from church lands and 
other investments. It is estimated that the annual income pays 
for approximately one-half the salaries of the clergy.24 The 
House of Lords contains twenty-six Anglican bishops who are 
the lords spiritual, while the life, hereditary, and law peers are 
the lords temporal. The synod of the Anglican Church has re­
sponsibility for doctrinal and liturgical matters but ultimately 
Parliament disposes. A major issue for the synod in 1992 is the 
ordination of women. If the synod were to approve the ordina­
tion of women — which is unlikely — the change would then 
likely require Parliamentary approval. It is unlikely that a mod­
ern-day Parliament would overturn the judgment reached by 
the synod on this or other controversial issues.
The Anglican Church plays a relatively modest role in British
24. Rupert E. Davies, The Church o f  England Observed (London: SCM Press, 
1984).
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education at this stage. Religious instruction, though a compo­
nent of the state school system, is quite broadly conceived and 
efforts in the recent educational reform to bill to tighten reli­
gious instruction failed. The one region of Britain where nega­
tive reaction resulted in the filing of a law suit against the 
Education Reform Act of the late 1980s was Northern Ireland, 
where Catholic bishops objected to the provision of the Act that 
if a confessional school parent association opted to have its 
school join the state system, the state would assume the costs of 
running the school. The Anglican Church leadership has es­
caped from having its ranks filled with government patronage 
appointments and from recruiting only from the upper reaches 
of English society. Since the 1940s, the church has also taken an 
increasing critical and independent role as a critic of public pol­
icy while retaining its role in the political institutional life of the 
nation.25 In 1990, the Anglican Church published the latest in a 
series of reports on issues of major public policy concern. The 
report, entitled “Living Faith in the City,” is a critical assess­
ment of the conservative government’s urban policy.26 It is 
clearly critical of the Conservative government. Supporters of 
the government pointed out that a church in which no more 
more than 1.5 million of its members regularly attend services 
would gain little attention for issuing such a report unless it was 
the established church.27
In short, the Anglican Church that separated from the Ro­
man Catholic Church in the sixteenth century has achieved a 
good deal of autonomy in the power of appointment and in 
managing its own funds. There is apparently little interest 
among its leadership in disestablishing the church with the 
likely consequence of being reduced to the sectarian role of a 
minor church. Its critics nevertheless argue that if the Church is 
to regain any sort of religious momentum it needs to be 
disestablished.28
25. Kenneth Medhurst and George Moyser, Church and Politics in a Secular Age 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
26. Archbishop of Canterbury's Advisory Group on Urban Priority Areas, “Living 
Faith in the City,” (London: General Synod of the Church of England, 1990).
27. David J. Smith, “Faith in the City and Mrs. Thatcher,” Policy Studies 11 (Sum­
mer 1990): 18-23.
28. Clifford Longley, “Manacled to a Spiritual Corpse: Why the Church of Eng­
land's Decline Is so Clearly Established,” Church and State 43 (March 1990): 19-20.
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Students of European church-state relations would be hard 
pressed not to conclude that the regulatory climate in contem­
porary Europe is unfavorable to the mainline churches. Silvio 
Ferrari points out that state budgets provide for some religious 
denominations in Spain, Italy (the religious tax is to come into 
effect later), Greece, Belgium, and Luxembourg. A religious tax 
provides income, as has been noted, in Germany; and also in 
Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Indirect 
support is provided in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden. Church access to television and radio is available 
without charge in much of Europe.29 For the most part, the 
principal churches of Europe have secured considerable auton­
omy and regulatory terms that grant them considerable re­
sources. It is true in the case of Sweden that the courts ruled 
that the Lutheran Church could not refuse to re-admit a self­
proclaimed atheist.30 Yet, while the principal churches may, as 
institutions, have achieved reasonable economic security, they 
have not thrived as focal points for their respective national 
populations.
As discussed earlier, the United States remains a remarkably 
singular nation in church attendance. Although weekly church 
attendance has fallen in the United States in the past thirty 
years, nonetheless, American church attendance remains higher 
at 43 percent in 1986 than attendance in most Western Euro­
pean nations. In the four countries of this study, weekly church 
attendance in 1986 was, respectively, Italy 36 percent, France 
12 percent, (West) Germany 21 percent, and England 14 per­
cent.31 When young people (defined as late teens and early 
twenties) were asked in the late 1980s how important religion 
should be in life, 9 percent in West Germany said very impor­
tant while in France and in Britain it was only 8 percent respec­
tively. In sharp contrast, 47 percent of young people in the 
United States claimed religion should be very important.32
A common pattern in all four states is the attenuation of the
29. Silvio Ferrari, “Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European 
Society,” Journal o f  Church and State 30 (Autumn 1988): 533-48.
30. Rosalie Beck and David Hendon, “Notes on Church and State Affairs,” Jour­
nal o f  Church and State 31 (Autumn 1989): 581-23.
31. Princeton Religion Research Center, Emerging Trends (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton Religion Research Center, 1988).
32. Princeton Religion Research Center, Emerging Trends (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton Religion Research Center, 1989).
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state role in selection of church hierarchies as well as in doctri­
nal and policy concerns of the church. Churches in Europe en­
joy organizational autonomy that is remarkable given the past.
Moreover, it is apparent that churches in three of the states 
— Germany, France, and England — are now identified with 
quite different activities respectively. These activities, this essay 
argues, need to be explained in reference to church interests 
and the pattern of regulatory relationships that has evolved in 
the postwar period. In France, where the separation of church 
and state has existed for most of this century, the Catholic 
Church by the most recent decade has been able to define itself 
in part as a producer of quality education rather than as princi­
pally a political advocate of a former regime. The public ap­
pears to accept the judgment that church schools produce a 
level of education that may be superior to that found in the 
troubled state system. This support for church-run schools does 
not result from their being viewed as bastions of faith and 
morals, but from the quality of the secular education offered in 
these schools. The French Church receives financial support 
from the state in running the Church school system. It is in the 
area of education that the French Catholic Church has been 
most successful in securing its position in what it took to be a 
challenge from the French government in the early 1980s.
The German churches also no longer define themselves in 
support or in opposition in a particular regime. Instead, 
churches in Germany emphasize issues in which they have a 
substantive incentive, especially social welfare policy. Their 
arena is not education but health care and social need. These 
are areas in which both major churches have assumed a public 
policy role and in which they receive state funding. The dra­
matic change in the fortunes of the East German Protestant 
churches may reflect the experience of other Eastern European 
churches where the churches assumed a political role in society 
in part because of the absence of alternatives. The East German 
churches were partially subsidized by the West German 
churches, which strengthened their position in a society short 
on resources. The unification of the two nations left the church 
abandoned by its membership and overtaken by secular organi­
zations who have assumed much of its political role. But over 
time it may be observed that the Protestant churches in East 
Germany will begin to carve a role in social welfare concerns as 
it stabilizes support from both the state and the local population.
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This avenue will not be easy to follow for the competing sects 
that have entered the old East Germany in last few years.
In England, the Anglican Church has little incentive to be 
actively engaged in education without antagonizing other con­
fessions. The state has a preemptive role in health care, and pri­
vate charities or the state assume significant roles in social 
welfare. The Anglican Church’s principal arena that sets it apart 
from other churches, indeed from the churches in the other 
states discussed herein, is its established role in the nation’s gov­
erning institutions and ceremonials. The Anglican Church has 
enjoyed, as has been noted, increasing insulation in being used 
by the state as a source of patronage. The Anglican Church is 
thus allowed to increasingly define its role as a sort of official 
clerical opposition or assessor of social conditions and public 
policies.
In Italy, the Vatican would appear to have concluded that 
the earlier concordat had resulted in too close an identification 
with the fortunes of the perpetually-in-office Christian Demo­
crats. The interest of the Vatican in supranational concerns may 
have promoted distancing of the Italian Catholic Church from 
the party structure it had helped to create after the Second 
World War. This venture in partial deregulation has seen the 
Italian Catholic Church move to act a good deal more like its 
counterparts in other European countries — de-emphasizing 
the partisan role for the role of a quasi-interest group seeking 
resources from the state. Similarly, the Spanish Catholic 
Church receives substantial economic support from a Socialist 
government that two generations ago sought to disestablish the 
Catholic Church there.33 If these brief accounts reflect the con­
dition of the principal churches in these nations, then a reason­
able inference is that over time the state has receded in 
regulation of churches partly as a result of increasing seculariza­
tion, and partly because of the complexity of the state’s becom­
ing immersed in questions of doctrine and personal selection. 
This is the risk of over-regulation leading to less regulation. Fi­
nally, in part because of the challenge of regulating a church 
when the state lacks information and resources to sustain regu­
latory rigor, the church is enabled to begin to reinterpret regu­
lations on favorable grounds. Even in France, where separation 
has existed since 1905, the state has been facilitative of the
33. Robert Graham, Spain: A Nation Comes o f  Age (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1984), 220-21.
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Catholic Church through its maintenance of church buildings 
and support of church-run schools.
In reviewing the four hypotheses outlined earlier, some very 
tentative assessments can be made. There is some support for 
the first hypotheses that where a church is sternly regulated but 
secular organizations proscribed, the church will play a broader 
political role. That would appear to have been the case in East 
Germany where the Protestant churches were a voluntary insti­
tution capable of a range of social and political expressions. 
There is evidence in support of the second hypothesis that regu­
latory windows of opportunity become attractive for churches 
as institutions. In Germany, France, and Britain, churches have 
assumed new roles in moving away from partisan politics to the 
provision of services or specific areas of public policy compe­
tence. It would appear that the Italian Catholic Church may be 
moving in the same direction by reducing its partisan role and 
assuming other responsibilities such as education. It is a process 
of regulatory adaptation that has enabled churches as institu­
tions to realize opportunities found in the regulatory environ­
ment that has emerged in the decades after the Second World 
War.
The third hypothesis, that church hierarchy is more likely to 
be independent when it receives state support, may be true. 
Certainly the Anglican Church’s income for those in official po­
sitions may afford the church leadership a freedom from raising 
funds from church members that churches without state sup­
port lack. Both German and English church leaders are signifi­
cant commentators on social and political issues. But for this 
third hypothesis to be sustained, there is need to consider the 
final hypothesis — the decline in state intervention in matters of 
doctrine and personal. The record seems quite clear in state af­
ter European state governments have surrendered their role for 
in the determination of church leaderships, church administra­
tive boundaries, the number of clergy, and many other clerical 
activities. Even in Britain the state has greatly greatly reduced 
its role in episcopal selection. In the wealthy and influential di- 
ocess of Cologne, Germany, there were serious objections 
among Roman Catholic leaders to the Vatican’s appointment of 
a particular Roman Catholic Bishop. However, the protest was 
to no avail. One can easily imagine a time when the state lead­
ership could intervene to block the appointment. Indeed, it 
seems that the fourth hypothesis is the most persuasively sup­
ported, for the evidence seems solid that the principal churches
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have achieved autonomy at the expense of state control without 
losing financial support and often privileged positions in their 
respective nations.
Future prospects for discontent in these countries lie in the 
increasingly active role of smaller churches and other religions 
in European societies. The European tradition has never really 
adopted the liberal principle of neutrality towards churches. 
Relations between the state and churches vary greatly from one 
church to another. Non-Catholic churches in Italy have pressed 
for greater separation between the state and the Roman Catho­
lic Church. This position has been echoed in Spain and in Brit­
ain.34 The Swedes have sought to deal with the issue of their 
state church and other religions by offering cash subventions to 
other churches that demonstrate that their respective member­
ships are over three thousand.35 But the Swedish solution may 
not always be well received with the structure of concordats and 
patterns of support that exist in other nations now confronted 
with increasing members of Christian churches that are non-Eu­
ropean in origin or with the return of Islam to Europe.36 The 
issue in the future will be the return to the debate over neutral­
ity as a stance for the state.
An unintended consequence of the anti-church model as 
found in some of the former Communist regimes of Eastern Eu­
rope is that the church may gain from the severe regulatory cli­
mate if, even though it is seriously and heavily regulated, it 
nonetheless can function to an extent not possible for other sec­
ular organizations. Under such conditions, the church may 
have the advantage of becoming an institutional magnet for 
those critical of the state. Paradoxically, therefore, the state 
may strengthen the church as a force in opposition to the state. 
But this advantage may only emerge when the church has an 
antecedent identification as a communal force as opposed to, 
say, a center of individuals seeking retreat from the world.37 If 
the church were associated with a prior distrusted regime, its
34. AU Bulletin, “British Parliament Rejects Parochiaid Expansion,” Church and 
State 44 (July-August 1991): 165; AU Bulletin, “Spanish Protestants, Jews Refuse 
Tax Aid,” Church and State 43 (April 1990): 93.
35. Swedish Institute, “Religion in Sweden,” Fact Sheets on Sweden (Stockholm: 
Swedish Institute, 1991).
36. Kevin Piecuch, “Islam Finds a New Home in Western Europe,” Christianity 
Today 34 (March 1990): 40-41.
37. Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar: The Politics o f  Religion in Eastern Eu­
rope and the U.S.S.R. (Champaign-Urbana, II.: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
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credibility may be severely reduced in becoming a focal point 
for a broad coalition of opposition forces.
Both the Irish and the Polish Catholic Churches enjoy con­
siderable support in their respective nations. The position of 
these two churches surely has been strengthened over time by 
their identification with the national aspirations of their respec­
tive populations. Both Ireland and Poland have histories of oc­
cupation by foreign powers. Thus the severity of regulation 
would confront a church firmly rooted in the population and 
would blunt the effectiveness of the state’s regulatory strategy. 
In other nations, where the church’s support in the population 
was marginal prior to the rise of an anti-church regime, the se­
verity of regulation may actually weaken an already fragile 
church. This may be the case, for example, in Cuba.
In Eastern Europe today, the discussion has returned to what 
it was in Western Europe two generations ago, where churches 
that were tolerated and severely regulated now see the oppor­
tunity to negotiate newly favorable terms of regulation between 
church and state. There are divisions as is already seen in the 
objections of smaller Protestant churches to ties between be­
tween the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish, Czech, and 
Slovak states respectively. But the larger issue is the extent to 
which, in the case of Poland, the state will undertake to realize 
Catholic values in public policy areas such as education, mar­
riage, or abortion.38 The test will be the capacity of the Catholic 
Church that played such a critical role in sustaining opposition 
to the Communist state to retain its power in an environment 
where secular organizations now have the opportunity to re­
build civil society.
C o n c l u s i o n
Today there is remarkable convergence in the regulatory 
practices of a number of European states in the West. The 
model is likely to be adopted by some states in the post-commu­
nist East. In the nineteenth century, churches were often the 
organizational expressions of religious movements that in some 
cases defended the state as a protector of a religious society or 
condemned the existing state as threatening the religious foun­
dations of society. Today few western European politicians are 
likely to see churches as representing such inclusive ideological 
movements. Rather, they are more likely to see them as inter­
38. Waldemar Chrostowski, “The Desert and After,” Voice, 9 July 1991, 10.
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est groups who also possess moral issue agendas but also who 
compete for resources and regulatory sympathy. This is not to 
say that religious leaders fail to speak out on the issues of the 
day. If anything, religious leaders probably believe that they 
have greater freedom to speak out today than their predeces­
sors had in the past. But such leaders speak from insulated posi­
tions as moral authorities rather than as heads of broad-based 
movements challenging or sustaining the very core assumptions 
of the state. States possessing the institutional responsibility to 
govern the internal affairs of churches either by concordat or by 
the terms of establishment of the national church have uni­
formly beat a sharp regulatory retreat, seeing greater costs than 
benefits in the regulatory enterprise. Thus, churches possess a 
good deal of internal autonomy and have been able to retain, 
and in some cases increase their claims on their respective 
states for material resources and regulatory preferment. It is this 
author’s judgment that the postwar regulatory regime in Eu­
rope has had the consequence of many of the old European 
churches undergoing a period of adjustment and emerging, in 
part, as successfully incorporated interest groups in their respec­
tive societies.
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